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Abstract
This paper aims to detect the presence of political 
budget cycles (PBuCs) around presidential elections in four 
large Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
and Mexico) over the 1982-2014 period, in the framework 
of democratic regimes. Extended autoregressive models are 
estimated for total public expenditure and their chief com-
ponents, considering the effect of economic fluctuations. 
Among the most important findings, weak evidence of PBuCs 
was found in the case of Argentina and Chile, while in the 
case of Mexico and Colombia, post-electoral adjustments in 
budget items sensitive to political manipulation were found, 
such as subsidies and public works, along with pre-electoral 
increases in total expenditure in the former one, and in goods 
and services in the latter.
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Ciclos políticos presupuestales  
en América Latina, 1982-2014
Resumen
El objetivo de este artículo es detectar la presencia de 
ciclos políticos presupuestales (CPP) en torno a las eleccio-
nes presidenciales de cuatro grandes países latinoamericanos 
(Argentina, Chile, Colombia y México) durante el periodo 
1982-2014, en el contexto de regímenes democráticos. Para 
ello, se estiman modelos autorregresivos extendidos para gasto 
público total y sus componentes principales, considerando el 
efecto de las fluctuaciones cíclicas. Entre los hallazgos más 
importantes está la evidencia débil de CPP en los casos de 
Argentina y Chile, mientras que en los casos de México y 
Colombia se encontraron ajustes postelectorales en partidas 
presupuestarias sensibles a la manipulación política, como 
subsidios y obras públicas, junto con aumentos preelectorales 
en el gasto total en el primero, y en bienes y servicios en el 
segundo.
Palabras clave: ciclo político presupuestal, gasto pú-
blico, América Latina. 
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INTRODUCTION
Economists have long been interested in determining the causes, transmission me-
chanisms, and consequences of the cyclical fluctuations of economic activity. Despite 
the persistence of conflicting interpretations, it is widely accepted that the causes 
of these cycles are related to supply shocks (mainly technological innovations), de-
mand shocks (economic policy adjustments), and changes in the economic agents’ 
perceptions (Sherman, 1991; Romer, 2006). Nevertheless, the historical evidence 
shows that political factors have also played a relevant role in generating economic 
fluctuations. In his seminal paper, Nordhaus (1975) addressed the influence of elec-
tions on the making of economic policy and their effects on variables that might gain 
electoral votes. Essentially, he assumed that citizens are shortsighted and interested 
only in the recent performance of macroeconomic variables that might directly 
affect them. Because of this, governments (and their political parties) could follow 
expansive policies before elections to spur production and employment, and, hence, 
to convince voters that they are competent managers of the economy. Moreover, 
voters generally do not realize that these policies tend to generate imbalances that 
need to be corrected after the elections by the incoming government, which would 
be obliged to adopt restrictive measures that could reduce economic activity in the 
future. Because of their origin, these cyclical patterns have been named political 
business cycles (PBC) (Dubois, 2016).
The international empirical evidence on the existence of political cycles, how-
ever, is ambiguous (McCallum, 1978; Alesina, 1989, among others). Considering the 
above, Weatherford (1987) argued that even if PBC models offer a sensible explana-
tion of the motivations of governments to manipulate the economy for the purpose 
of gaining votes, these outcomes (real effects) rarely occur. Therefore, following the 
publication of Tufte’s (1978) paper on the experience of the United States and other 
high-income democracies, the analytical focus moved to the manipulation of fiscal 
instruments for electoral purposes. In other words, the attention shifted from the 
study of the “ends” towards the investigation of the dynamics of the “means.” Because 
of its nature, this phenomenon has been called a political budget cycle (PBuC), de-
fined by Shi and Svensson (2003: 67) as “a periodic fluctuation in a government’s 
fiscal policies, which is induced by the cyclicality of elections.” 
The PBuC research agenda felt the impact of the rational expectations theory, 
starting with the famous work by Lucas (1972), which, rejecting axiomatically that 
manipulation of fiscal variables for political purposes were an option, inhibited 
the development of research in this area. Thus, optimizing individuals, who have 
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complete information and are capable of fully discerning the future, could not be 
repeatedly deceived, nor would politicians, as rational actors, devote energy to carry 
out such an inefficient scheme. As succinctly stated by Persson and Tabellini (2000), 
it would be highly problematic to combine the fully rational actuation of individuals 
as economic agents with their manipulation as voters. Within this theoretical fra-
mework, the existence of PBuCs could hardly have scientific standing.
Later, a helpful revision of the scope of the rational expectations assumption 
spurred by economic psychology and its analysis of cognitive mechanisms has ex-
plained how the formation and maintenance of wrong beliefs and perceptions on 
reality might be constitutive of individuals’ mental maps in every society (Kahneman, 
2003; North, 2005). This, in turn, indirectly contributed to fostering the resumption 
of research on PBuCs with greater conceptual sophistication and more refined ins-
truments to measure them.
At the same time, the research on PBuCs, previously restricted to the OECD 
area, was extended to middle- and low-income countries that are characterized 
by having younger democratic regimes and higher levels of institutional fragility. 
Particularly, a number of studies have investigated this phenomenon in several Latin 
American countries. This literature can be classified in three groups according to 
the methodology used. 
First, by applying extended autoregressive (AR) models, Remmer (1993) 
analyzed fourteen elections in eight Latin American countries, finding no evidence 
of PBuCs in their fiscal balances. Later, Ogura (2000) detected an increase in the 
wage bill paid by Brazilian incoming governments during their first year in office, 
owing to the lag in the impact of wages raised before elections, for political aims. 
 In a second group that analyzes the experience of Mexico with AR models, 
Magaloni (2000) reports evidence of PBuCs in total public expenditure, but also 
finds that the estimates of post-electoral contractions lose statistical significance 
when the unemployment rate is included as a control variable, which may imply 
that the decline is, in fact, caused by recessions that often occurred during the first 
year of several administrations.1 In addition, González (2002) concludes that the 
magnitude of the cycles increases along with a country’s democratization process, 
since political competition brings about a greater chance of losing elections, which 
leads governments to overspend in order to gain votes. On the other hand, Reyes 
1 In Mexico, fiscal adjustments have been carried out during the first year of various administrations to deal with 
recessions provoked by macroeconomic imbalances (1983 and 1995) or international crises (2001). 
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and Mejía (2016) estimate extended autoregressive and moving average models that 
include the effects of economic factors (captured by fluctuations in manufacturing 
production) and find evidence of PBuCs in total expenditure as well as in current 
and capital expenditures. 
Finally, the third group of studies based on panel data models deals with larger 
country samples, including Latin America, and incorporates more variables, such as 
fiscal balance, total expenditure and revenues, primary expenditure, transferences 
and subsidies, as well as current and capital expenditures. Their findings indicate 
that voters are more susceptible to manipulation through current expenditures 
(Nieto-Parra & Santiso, 2012; Kraemer, 1997), and that the presence of PBuCs is 
conditional on a country’s degree of democratic consolidation (Barberia & Avelino, 
2011; Klomp & De Hann, 2013; Brender & Drazen, 2005).
OBJECTIVES
Although these studies have shed light on the elusive phenomenon of PBuCs in several 
Latin American countries, the evidence is still rather mixed. In this paper, we revisit 
this topic and evaluate the PBuC hypothesis in four of the most important economies 
in Latin America: Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico.2 In particular, we seek to 
determine whether or not different components of the public expenditure actually 
do increase significantly prior to presidential elections in order to bias voters’ pre-
ferences towards incumbent parties, even though those expenses would have to be 
cut back after the elections to correct the resulting imbalances.
These four countries share common institutional features, such as a presiden-
tial system with bicameral congresses and a large number of political parties. They 
differ, nonetheless, in their political organization, since Argentina and Mexico have 
federal systems, while Colombia and Chile are unitary republics. The period under 
consideration (1982-2014) was characterized by a political transition from autho-
ritarian regimes, including military dictatorship in two out of the four countries, to 
democratic systems that have gradually been consolidated.3 Allowing for Colombia’s 
longer democratic trajectory, despite a prolonged civil war, the development of 
2 Brazil has not been included in the analysis due to the unavailability of disaggregated data on public expenditure 
for some years. 
3 It is usually accepted that until 1978 only Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Colombia 
(weakly) could be classified as developed democracies in Latin America (Payne et al., 2006). 
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democracy and electoral competition was the paramount feature in the selected 
countries (Taylor, 2009). 
Notwithstanding the existence of an ongoing discussion regarding the quality 
of Latin American democracies (Mainwaring & Pérez Liñán, 2006; Smith, 2012), 
democratic rules seem to have consistently structured the path to accessing power 
in the area, fulfilling the general requisite for PBuCs: the existence of competitive 
elections.4 
Our analysis covers twenty-four presidential elections carried out under 
democratic regimes in the above-mentioned countries, according to the following 
distribution: seven elections in Argentina, since 1983; eight in Colombia, since 1986; 
six in Chile, since 1989, and three in Mexico, since 2000. 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on PBuCs by introducing two 
variants into the analysis. First, single-equation models are estimated for each 
country to obtain specific evidence for each case and, in that sense, supplement the 
findings reported in studies that use panel data methods, which actually estimate 
the average effect of elections on the complete set of fiscal indicators in the sample. 
Second, the introduction of control variables in the model allows us to avoid the 
identification of spurious PBuCs that may result from the use of fiscal policies to 
stabilize business cycles.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Like general macroeconomics, PBC and PBuC models have substantially changed 
over time in function of the role assigned to agent expectations. The first genera-
tion of PBC models was based on three key assumptions. First, the economy was 
characterized by a Phillips curve “augmented” with inflation expectations, where 
voters valued high employment rates positively, and high unemployment rates, 
negatively. Second, inflation expectations are adaptive in the sense that they are 
formed based on history in the same variable. Third, voters are shortsighted, with 
short-run memory, which drives them to cast their vote in response to the recently 
observed performance of their economies (mainly production and employment). 
The combination of these conditions encouraged politicians to engage in oppor-
tunistic behaviors, resulting in implementing expansive policies before elections, 
4 Brender and Drazen (2005) stress that, both from empirical and conceptual standpoints, democratic elections 
are an indispensable requirement for the occurrence of a PBuC.
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followed by restrictive adjustments later, to correct the resulting macroeconomic 
imbalances (Nordhaus, 1975).5 Consequently, within this frame, public finances 
tended to display cyclical patterns linked to the elections.
A new generation of PBC models, which allow for opportunistic or partisan 
motivations, have incorporated rational expectations (Borsani, 2003). Under these 
assumptions, agents form their expectations based on all available information: 
they have full knowledge of the evolution of and interactions between the variables 
of interest, as well as of their governments’ reaction functions. Thus, they cannot 
be systematically deceived. Hence, opportunistic behavior is constrained since 
politicians, anticipating a null response from voters to manipulation, have scarce 
incentives to activate PBuCs.
Nonetheless, under conditions of asymmetric information and bounded 
rationality, it is possible for PBuC to emerge from the opportunistic behavior of in-
cumbents. Because of this, some recent studies have made room for two plausible 
assumptions that have not been refuted by empirical research. First, there seems to 
be political benefits for parties in power when their voters perceive that the economy 
is performing well (Hibbs, 2006); the size of such benefits varies and is contingent 
on each country’s institutional framework, which defines the incentives for engaging 
in fiscal manipulation before elections. Second, the voters’ bounded rationality and 
short memory can lead them to overestimate the economy’s immediate past perfor-
mance as an indicator of its general condition (Olters, 2012).6 
Moreover, there may be informational asymmetries in the decision-making 
processes typical of principal-agent relationships, combined with elements of moral 
hazard: politicians know better than their citizens their actual ability to manage the 
economy (Aboal, Lorenzo & Oddone, 2001). Governments engage in a signaling game 
to impress the voters with their efficiency in implementing stabilization policies, 
although they may not be always successful in this (Rogoff, 1990). Thus, it will not 
always be optimal for governments to try to artificially improve their reputation. 
5 In an alternative partisan view, Hibbs (1977) posits that political parties behave according to ideological moti-
vations and maximize their objective function that weights differently the cost of unemployment in relation to 
inflation. In that sense, parties are located at different points on an augmented Phillips curve throughout their 
periods in office. Right-wing parties privilege the control of inflation over employment, while left-wing ones 
adopt the opposite priority. See Alesina (1987) and Alesina and Sachs (1988) for further insights on partisan 
models.
6 The fact that a backward-looking perspective shapes the electoral choice of a proportion of citizens does 
not exclude the existence of forward-looking individuals, who behave according to the rational expectations 
assumption. 
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Hence, in these models the manipulation of fiscal variables is expected to be less 
systematic and evident than in the Nordhaus model, and the predicted cycles are 
shorter and less regular.7 
It is important to stress that the size of information asymmetries and, there-
fore, the politicians’ opportunity to manipulate economic policy vary according to 
their institutional settings. It could be claimed, in a stylized form, that “open access 
societies”—characterized by high per capita income, robust democracies, rule of 
the law, accountability, high levels of human capital, and the existence of numerous 
civic organizations—provide information relevant for the public opinion, which 
can effectively restrict the incentives for the incumbent governments to engage in 
political opportunism (North, Wallis & Weingast 2009; Brender & Drazen, 2003). 
Conversely, “limited access societies”—where the mentioned elements only exist in 
a fragmentary and reduced form and usually entail high information costs—offer 
greater opportunities for political manipulation, as well as for impunity for engaging 
in such behavior (Shi & Svensson, 2000, 2006). Therefore, opportunistic government 
behavior tends to appear more in emerging economies due to their institutional 
fragilities, which allow greater discretionary power in the management of fiscal 
variables (Schuknecht, 1996). Because of this, a contextual determination of PBuCs 
is necessary according to the specific properties of the political institutions in each 
country (Franzese & Jusko, 2008). 
This view differs from the democratic learning model formulated by Brender 
and Drazen (2005), which assumes that “new democracies” differ from “consolida-
ted democracies” regarding the actual possibilities for the emergence of PBuCs. In 
their model, countries that transit to or return to democracy undergo the effect of 
democratic inexperience on PBuCs until most of the citizens have learned the political 
game. For practical purposes, these authors claim that the “new democracy” status 
extends through four successive elections after the initial implementation of demo-
cratic rules, after which it is assumed that voters would have completely learned how 
the system works and these procedures would have become fully institutionalized. 
However, no definitive theoretical reasons exist for assuming that democratic 
transitions evolve only in an incremental and linear way. In fact, empirical evidence 
points at regressions and stagnations occurring in these processes. Therefore, the 
consolidation of democracies rather depends on the institutional configuration of 
7 See Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and Persson and Tabellini (1990). 
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specific societies, and the structure of the relations between their economies and 
politics.
At the same time, since institutional features that shape the relationship bet-
ween the executive and the legislative branches play a relevant role in the emergence 
of PBuCs, it is important to identify the features of the budget process in each country 
(Saporiti & Streb, 2008). Despite the existence of a variety of institutional arrange-
ments in the countries analyzed, the executive branch in each one is responsible for 
proposing an annual budget plan to the Congress, usually with some restrictions on 
the increase in fiscal deficit or in public expenditure. Congresses have a deadline to 
promulgate their budgets, and in some countries, the executive holds veto power, 
either globally or by item, on modifications to the budget, although legislators can 
overcome vetoes by a qualified majority. 
A crucial issue for which systematized information is still scarce is the effective 
degree of control that governments have over the execution of budgets, particularly, 
regarding their ability to reassign funds between items during the fiscal year. Despite 
formal mechanisms for auditing and overseeing public accounts, the available evi-
dence points to a limited capacity of control on the part of legislators, which makes 
possible fiscal manipulation for electoral aims (Santiso, 2007).
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
In this paper, we estimate extended autoregressive models for different components 
of the public expenditure to identify PBuC patterns in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
and Mexico.8 Following a generalized practice in the literature, dichotomous varia-
bles are added to capture any difference that occurs in the growth rates of these 
variables during the election year and the prior one, versus the growth rates of the 
subsequent year. In other words, if incumbents do manipulate public spending for 
electoral purposes, growth rates would be above the mean in the former case, and 
below (even with negative values) in the year following elections. It should be noted 
that the alternation of the signs of the manipulation of public expenditure around 
elections has a short-lived impact. Hence, the dummy variables seek to measure the 
immediate effects of the presence or absence of elections.
8 This approach allows identifying country-specific characteristics, which is not possible in the joint analysis of 
large samples. 
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In order to avoid biases due to specification errors that result from omitted 
variables, two control variables are introduced. First, an output measure is used 
to isolate the effects of business cycles on government expenditures (Grier, 1987; 
Pepinsky, 2007), since fiscal cuts may be aimed at containing recessions rather than 
being an adjustment to electoral overspending. In this case, the dynamics of expen-
diture would respond to macroeconomic stabilization objectives. Given that fiscal 
policies implemented in Latin America have been mainly pro-cyclical, it would be 
easy to misinterpret restrictive stabilization policies for post-electoral adjustments.9 
Second, total public revenue, i.e. tax revenues plus new public debt, is also introdu-
ced as a control variable with the purpose of measuring a government’s spending 
capacity during the current year, because the size of its spending constrains the 
electoral manipulation of expenditures. Based on these considerations, the general 
model to be estimated is specified as follows: 
          [1]
where gkt denotes the annual growth rate of the k-th component of public ex-
penditure; ct is an indicator of the business cycle measured by GDP growth rates or 
GDP deviations from the underlying trend estimated by means of the Hodrick and 
Prescott filter (1997).10 it denotes the growth rate of total public revenues, and εt is a 
perturbation that follows a Gaussian white noise process such as εt~ iidN (0, σ2) that 
meets the assumptions of a linear regression. In turn, eτ is the dummy variable that 
accounts for the effects of elections on public expenditure, and then eτ= 1 when the 
τ-th election is celebrated, and 0, otherwise. The variables eτ –1 and eτ +1 are defined in 
an analogous manner to account for the effects of elections over the years previous 
and subsequent to elections, respectively.11 
9 Fiscal policy in Latin America has been essentially pro-cyclical, with increases in public expenditure occurring 
during expansions, and adjustments during recessions, not only due to the contraction of revenues, but also due 
to the notion that macroeconomic balances, especially the fiscal ones, must be strengthened during recessive 
phases, to lessen instability and to attract investment, allowing economic recovery to occur (Gavin & Perotti, 
1997; Talvi & Végh 2005).
10 Growth rates can be considered as an approximation of the classical business cycle (Osborn, Pérez & Sensier, 
2005), which is defined as the alternation of phases of expansion and recession. In turn, deviations of production 
from their underlying trends are associated with the concept of growth cycles (Lucas, 1977).
11 Notice that working with annual data only allows this specification, since it is not possible to capture the effects 
of elections celebrated in the mid-year over the previous and subsequent twelve months (or four quarters), 
an issue known as time aggregation (Streb, Lema & Garofalo, 2012). For an analysis based on quarterly data, 
which allows distinguishing different time effects, see Reyes and Mejía (2016). 
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The coefficients of the model are expected to have appropriate statistical pro-
perties and values consistent with theory. In particular, the values of the autoregressi-
ve coefficients αi, which measure the persistence of the series, should guarantee that 
public expenditure is a stationary process; their order is determined by minimizing 
the Akaike information criterion.12 In turn, if the dynamics of public expenditure are 
driven by opportunistic behavior, it is expected that βa, βe > 0 and βd < 0. On the other 
hand, Υ < 0 if fiscal policy responds to stabilizing criteria, and vice versa. Finally, if 
expenditures are conditioned by the revenues, δ > 0. To avoid collinearity between 
the cycle indicator and total revenues (due to their high correlation), models are 
estimated incorporating only one of these two variables. 
The series of total public expenditure as well as its components (current and 
investment expenditure) are analyzed for the four countries studied within this 
framework. This disaggregation allows us to distinguish electoral manipulation 
in different spending items. Particularly, it is expected that consumption transfers 
(current expenditure) have a more direct effect than spending on public works 
(investment expenditures), since the former presents the voters with immediate 
benefits, although both outlays may work in the same direction. 
EVIDENCE OF PBuC 
The econometric analysis of public expenditures in Latin America faces several 
drawbacks, spanning from restrictions on obtaining long homogeneous series to 
difficulties in modeling their dynamics.13 In order to analyze the presence of PBuCs 
in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico over the 1982-2014 period, we have 
used data from the Government Finance Statistics elaborated by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for the 1980-1989 period and from CEPALSTAT, published 
by the Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean for 1990-2014 
(CEPAL, 2015).14 All nominal figures have been deflated, and converted to real terms, 
12 An autoregressive process is stationary if the roots of the lag polynomial L(∅) = 0 are outside the unit circle. 
When this condition is fulfilled, it is possible to apply conventional estimation and inference methods (Johnston 
& DiNardo, 1997).
13 According to Reyes and Mejía (2016), the public expenditure series exhibit atypical statistical features associated 
with the presence of anomalous values, which generates empirical distributions with an excess of kurtosis and 
usually a positive bias. They argue that these properties might be explained by the discretionary management 
of public accounts. Additionally, the lack of continuous and homogeneous series has led several authors to use 
different data sources (Nieto & Santiso, 2012; Barberia & Avelino, 2011).
14 The series from these two sources were chained by using 1990 as the year of reference. To account for the pos-
sibility of differentiated dynamics of the series over these two subsamples, a dichotomous variable is introduced 
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using the GDP deflator for each of the four countries, published by the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. 
The growth rates of several components of real public expenditures are 
modeled according to expression (1). In order to apply conventional econometric 
models, the stationarity of the series was verified using common unit root tests. The 
econometric strategy consists of three steps. First, the order of the autoregressive 
component is identified and, second, the electoral variables are introduced; in the 
third step, dichotomous variables are added to capture the effects of anomalous 
values (outliers).15 In a few series of Argentina and Mexico, however, some outliers 
were removed in the first step since their very large values distorted the modelling 
process. Additionally, given that data come from different sources, a dichotomous 
variable (DAT) is added to distinguish between them. The specification of these final 
models is evaluated by using tests of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, normality, 
and functional form.16 
The model estimations for all variables and countries are presented in Tables 
1 to 12. In general, model specifications are adequate, although some issues of nor-
mality and functional form persist in some cases. Three different formulations of the 
model are estimated for each country, depending on the variable used to control for 
the effects of business cycles, as previously mentioned.17
The estimates for Argentina are shown in Tables 1 to 3. The first interesting 
result is that the GDP and public revenue growth rates are statistically significant 
in all models, except in the capital transfers and expenditure on goods and services 
models, respectively (Tables 1 and 2). In contrast, the GDP gap as a control varia-
ble is not statistically significant in any model (Table 2). Moreover, the estimated 
coefficients of the GDP growth rates are positive, which suggests that fiscal policy 
has been essentially pro-cyclical in this country over the period, as shown by other 
in the model with a value of 0 up to 1989, and 1 from 1990 onwards, as done by Barberia and Avelino (2011). 
The variables analyzed for each country are described in Appendix 1.
15 If a residual is greater than three times its standard deviation, it is considered as an anomalous value and is 
removed by introducing a corresponding dummy variable. D1991, for example, denotes the dummy to remove 
an outlier occurring in 1991. 
16 The residuals are tested for normality and specification errors by using the conventional Jarque-Bera (1987) 
and the Ramsey (1969) test, respectively. If the residuals of the model exhibit heteroscedasticity or heterosce-
dasticity and autocorrelation, standard errors are corrected by using the White (1980) and the Newey-West 
(1987) correction methods, respectively. In order to save space, the estimates of the specification and unit root 
tests are not reported, but they are available upon request. 
17 In fact, in the preliminary estimations, GDP growth rates and public revenues were included as control variables 
in each model, but usually the latter were not statistically significant.
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studies, while the positive coefficients of the public revenue growth rate imply that 
this factor conditions the government’s spending capacity. 
In turn, the evidence of PBuCs is weak: the estimated coefficients of the 
dichotomous variables for election years or the previous year are not statistically 
significant, or they have the opposite sign to the one suggested by theory. However, 
some spending contractions are detected in the year after elections, especially when 
public revenues are incorporated as a control variable (Table 3), which is indeed 
consistent with the PBuC hypothesis. Although the effects of several outliers are 
estimated, they can be linked to electoral manipulation only in the case of the 1983 
elections, in items such as subsidies and other current transfers.18 
The estimates for Colombia are displayed in Tables 4 to 6. It is worth noting 
that GDP growth rates do not have a statistically significant relationship with the 
components of public expenditure, whereas the GDP gap is related to total and cu-
rrent expenditures. In turn, total revenues seem to explain expenditure on goods and 
services, as well as capital expenditure and acquisitions of fixed capital assets.19 The 
evidence of PBuC is partial, though there are some robust results to be highlighted: 
there is a statistically significant increase in expenditure on goods and services and, 
in two model specifications, in the acquisition of fixed capital assets during the year 
previous to elections, as well as a cutback in subsidies and other current transfers 
during the year following elections. The existing outliers in this case cannot be asso-
ciated with elections or natural disasters. Our results, mainly those concerning fixed 
capital asset expenditures, are consistent with those reported by Drazen and Eslava 
(2003), who found a significant increase before and up to the period of elections. 
Overall, the emergence of PBuC in the Colombian case might be explained by the 
survival of some practices and political conflicts that have hindered the consolidation 
of the Colombian democratic system, such as political clientelism, drug trafficking, 
internal armed conflict, and erosion of weights and counterweights that are charac-
teristic of mature democracies (Botero, Hoskin & Pachón, 2010). This context offers 
18 The presidential elections of 1983, associated to the Process of National Reorganization, mark the return of 
democracy in Argentina after the military dictatorship (Camou, 1995). Hence, the electoral manipulation of 
public spending might be explained by the inexperience of democratic system, as Canes-Wrone y Ponce de 
León (2015) suggest. The rest of anomalous values could be associated with natural disasters in 1985 and 1993 
(Lavell, 2004). The latter, in fact, was removed before modelling the series of capital expenditure and capital 
transferences, as mentioned above. 
19 In this case, the dichotomous variable utilized to account for differences in data sources was not significant in 
most of the models.
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incentives for policymakers to manipulate economic policy instruments to obtain 
electoral and partisan benefits, as Franzese and Jusko (2008) suggest.20
The results for Chile (Tables 7 to 9) indicate that public expenditure and its 
components are mildly associated with economic activity and public revenue indica-
tors, providing only weak evidence of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. There is no robust 
evidence of PBuCs along the lines of expansive policies before elections, though a 
subsequent adjustment is detected in the cases of total expenditure (but only at 
10% of significance), capital expenditure, and the acquisition of fixed capital assets 
(at 5%), as shown in the estimates of Tables 7 and 9. Regarding the outliers, the one 
identified for 1989 could be linked to the first election held after the military dicta-
torship, but the estimated coefficients of the corresponding dichotomous variables 
in the models of total and current expenditure are negative, probably caused by ad-
justments following the Tarapaca earthquake in 1987 (CSN, 2016) and the eruption 
of the Volcano Lonquimay in 1988 (Moreno & Gardeweg, 1989). 
Finally, estimations of PBuCs in Mexico are displayed in Tables 10 to 12. It should 
be emphasized that free general elections in this country were held only from 2000 
on, while prior to that the competition to the party in power during several decades, 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, for its acronym in Spanish), was rather 
limited (Velázquez, 2008). However, according to González (2002), the political com-
petition has increased over time, especially since the elections of 1988, which may 
have motivated the authorities to engage in opportunistic practices, according to the 
view expressed by Brender and Drazen (2005). Therefore, the effects of elections on 
public expenditure could have been different before 2000 when the possibilities of 
fiscal manipulation were higher. On the contrary, once political competition increased 
further and other institutional conditions improved (divided government, change of 
party in power, more free media, and others), the use of public expenditure to gain 
votes could have become more difficult.21 In order to assess differences in the dynamics 
of public expenditure within these periods and the emergence of PBuCs, two sets of 
dichotomous electoral variables are introduced, defined according to expression (1): 
20 The existing outliers in this case cannot be associated with elections or natural disasters. Elections were held 
in 1986 and 1990, thus some extraordinary rise in expenditure would be expectable. Moreover, in 1985, the 
volcano Nevado del Ruiz erupted, and between 1989 and 1992, a number of disasters occurred, among which 
there was another eruption of the Nevado, the overflowing of the San Carlos and Cauca Rivers, as well as an 
earthquake and a drought provoked by El Niño (Hermelin, 2005). Therefore, it is curious that anomalous 
values for 1985 and 1990 are negative.
21 Indeed, from 1997 to 2018, Mexico experienced a divided government, which may have brought about a better 
monitoring of public expenditure. The evidence, however, shows that the emergence of PBuCs has not been 
completely excluded (Reyes, Mejía & Riguzzi, 2013). 
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the first set accounts for the effects of elections on spending between 1982 and 1994, 
while the second one comprises those from 2000 to 2012.22 
The results for the Mexican case point out that fiscal policy over the entire 
period was mainly pro-cyclical, but with several exceptions, since the estimated co-
efficient of business cycle indicators are not always statistically significant (Cuadra, 
2008; Mejía, 2003; Reyes & Mejía, 2012). The estimated coefficients of public reve-
nues, however, are not statistically significant, suggesting that this variable is largely 
unimportant in the management of government expenditure. 
Concerning PBuCs, the first set of electoral variables shows a significant rise in 
total expenditure before electoral years in each of the three model specifications.23 
Some other items, like personal services, increase before election dates in some model 
specifications. Yet, these cannot be considered as robust results. Noteworthy is the 
fact that the estimated coefficients for electoral years are negative in some cases, 
opposite to the claims of the PBuC theory; this may be due to the time aggregation of 
the data, given that elections are held in the middle of the year.24 About post-electoral 
adjustments, a robust result points to a fall in public works expenditures, a variable 
highly sensitive to electoral manipulation, as suggested by Schuknecht (1996).25 
On the other hand, the evidence of PBuCs in total expenditure becomes weaker 
after the 2000 elections since the electoral dummies are statistically significant 
only when GDP growth rates are used as a control variable. Nonetheless, there is 
some evidence of pre-electoral increases in variables such as current expenditure, 
personal services, and general and other services. Then, only few electoral variables 
seem to be statistically significant or have robust effects, possibly due to a better 
22 Although the 1988 and 1994 elections were contested, in the end, the PRI maintained its hegemony by a 
wide margin. The share of votes received by this party was 50.4 and 48.7%, respectively (Instituto Nacional 
Electoral, 2016). 
23 Flores (2007), Magaloni (2000), and Reyes and Mejía (2016) also report results that are robust regarding the 
sign of the estimated coefficient in the case of total expenditure, with an increase occurring before the election 
period.
24 In this sense, the time aggregation problem affects Mexican data. Since elections are held during the first days 
of July, the aggregate figures of the electoral year combine the results of expansive pre-electoral policies with 
those resulting from restrictive post-electoral adjustments. The signs of the estimated coefficients suggest that 
the latter is greater than the former. 
25 These results differ from those reported by Reyes and Mejía (2016), who argue that the high degree of discre-
tionary management of public expenditures may explain the lack of statistical significance of their findings. 
However, they do not distinguish between the two political regimes considered here. 
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monitoring of public expenditures by the Chamber of Deputies in the framework of 
divided government, which is consistent with theory.26 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper tests the presence of PBuCs in four important Latin American countries, 
searching for evidence around the presidential elections of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
and Mexico, over the 1982-2014 period. Extended autoregressive models have been 
estimated to model the growth rates of total public expenditure and its main com-
ponents, incorporating electoral variables and controlling for the effects of business 
cycles on fiscal policy through several indicators. 
As in other national cases, this phenomenon has been elusive. The results indi-
cate that fiscal policies have been pro-cyclical, and provide weak support for the PBuC 
hypothesis, particularly for Argentina, on both counts. Nevertheless, for Colombia 
and Mexico (the latter before 2000), there is evidence of significant increase prior 
to elections in total expenditure, as well as in expenditure on goods and services, 
followed by cutbacks in components highly sensitive to political manipulation, such 
as subsidies and public works. These cuts are also recognizable in Chile regarding 
various components of public spending, mostly in capital expenditure and the acqui-
sition of fixed capital assets.
By and large, our findings show how difficult it is to validate the electoral 
manipulation of expenditure, no matter how evident it may appear to many citizens, 
especially in some countries. Although the temporal aggregation resulting from the 
use of annual data might contribute to explaining these difficulties, the surge of PBuCs 
is a consequence of several political and economic factors that should be summed 
up as explanatory variables. However, statistical information to measure these is 
rarely available. The literature has underlined the role of institutional frameworks in 
budget negotiations between the executive and the legislative branches as a crucial 
issue for the emergence of PBuCs (Saporiti & Streb, 2008). Of course, the degree of 
consolidation of the democratic system and other institutional arrangements play a 
26 Neither the identified outliers, nor the fall in personal services in 1983 can be directly associated with electoral 
manipulation. The latter may have been part of the stabilization policy following the debt crisis of 1982, while 
the increase of several components of public expenditure can be explained by the damages caused by Hurri-
cane Pauline in 1997. In fact, this outlier was removed previously to the modelling of current expenditure and 
personal services expenditure. 
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central role in this, through the process of defining, executing, and supervising the 
use of public funds. 
In this regard, we can say that democracy has evolved at a different pace in 
these four countries, which can partially explain our results. According to Polity IV 
(Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2014), Argentina and Colombia, on one hand, display a 
better and more stable democratic performance, although the latter still faces some 
obstacles for a full consolidation (Botero, Hoskin & Pachón, 2010). On the other, 
Mexico holds a lower position (mainly due to the weakness of checks on its executive 
power), even if its institutions have significantly improved over the last two decades. 
Chile, in turn, has the best-qualified democracy in the group, despite that it began 
at a very low level. Overall, the development of democratic systems seems to have 
constrained the emergence of PBuCs in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico (since 2000), 
but less so in Colombia. 
The evidence provided here needs to be supplemented by further research 
based on alternative empirical methods capable of incorporating the role of political 
factors together with economic mechanisms, as well as other forms of diverting public 
funds or providing fiscal exemptions to cronies. Further inquiry on these issues is 
relevant, not only because politicians’ abuses of power might undermine the cred-
ibility of democratic institutions, but also because economic policies that deviate 
from welfare objectives generate social waste, which benefits only particular groups.
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APPENDIX 1. CHARACTERISTICS AND SOURCES OF 
ANALYZED VARIABLES BY COUNTRY 
Variable Concept
TGTAR Argentina’s total expenditure 
TGCAR Argentina’s current expenditure
TGBSAR Argentina’s expenditure on goods and services 
TSTAR Argentina’s subsidies and other current transferences 
TGKAR Argentina’s capital expenditure 
TKFAR Argentina’s acquisition of fixed capital assets 
TTKAR Argentina’s capital transferences 
TPIBAR Argentina’s real GDP growth rate 
TITAR Argentina’s total government revenues 
TGTCH Chile’s total expenditure
TGCCH Chile’s current expenditure 
TGBSCH Chile’s expenditure on goods and services 
TGKCH Chile’s capital expenditure 
TKFCH Chile’s acquisition of fixed capital assets
TTKCH Chile’s capital transferences 
TPIBCH Chile’s real GDP growth rate 
TITCH Chile’s total government revenues
TGTCO Colombia’s total expenditure
TGCCO Colombia’s current expenditure 
TGBSCO Colombia’s expenditure on goods and services 
TSTCO Colombia’s subsidies and other current transferences 
TGKCO Colombia’s capital expenditure 
TKFCO Colombia’s acquisition of fixed capital assets
TPIBCO Colombia’s real GDP growth rate index 
TITCO Colombia’s total government revenues
TGTMEX Mexico’s total expenditure
TGPMEX Mexico’s programmable expenditure 
TGCMEX Mexico’s current expenditure 
TSPMEX Mexico’s personal services 
TMSMEX Mexico’s materials and supplies 
TSGMEX Mexico’s general and other services 
TGKMEX Mexico’s capital expenditure 
TBMIMEX Mexico’s movable and immovable property 
TOPMEX Mexico’s public works 
TIFMEX Mexico’s physical investment 
TSTMEX Mexico’s subsidies and transferences
TGNPMEX Mexico’s non-programmable expenditure 
TPIBMEX Mexico’s real GDP growth rate 
TITMEX Mexico’s total government revenues 
Data from 1980 to 1990 were collected from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics yearbooks 
and for the 1990-2014 period from the CEPALSTAT database of ECLAC, in the government 
operations section, except for Mexico, whose data were obtained from the Bank of Mexico 
(BANXICO). The GDP real index and total government revenues were obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. To combine data from the two sources, the 
series were chained from 1990. As already stated, the nominal figures were deflated by using 
the GDP deflator as published in the IFS. 
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Table 1. 
Econometric estimation of PBuC in Argentina controlling by the GDP growth rate,  
1982-2014
Expenditure Total Current expenditure 
Expenditure 













































































































R2 0.716 0.731 0.503 0.806 0.882 0.440 0.791
Figures in parenthesis are p-values. DAT denotes a dichotomous variable to capture differences 
attributed to changing the source of data from 1990 on, while DX refers to a dichotomous 
variable that seeks to remove outliers present in year X. The model specification tests are 
available upon request. * Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
(Newey-West correction). ** Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (White correction). 
# An outlier present in 1993 was removed previously to the modelling of the dependent 
variable. 
Source: authors' elaboration based on data from IMF (various) and ECLAC (2015).
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Table 2. 
Econometric estimation of PBuC in Argentina controlling by the GDP gap,  
1982-2014















































































































R2 0.623 0.635 0.326 0.748 0.654 0.317 0.789
Figures in parenthesis are p-values. DAT denotes a dichotomous variable to capture differences 
attributed to changing the source of data from 1990 on, while DX refers to a dichotomous 
variable that seeks to remove outliers present in year X. The model specification tests are 
available upon request. * Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (White correction). # 
An outlier present in 1993 was removed previously to the modelling of the dependent variable.
Source: authors' elaboration based on data from IMF (various) and ECLAC (2015).
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Table 3. 
Econometric estimation of PBuC in Argentina controlling by total government revenues, 
1982-2014















































































































R2 0.755 0.732 0.387 0.885 0.739 0.414 0.476
Figures in parenthesis are p-values. DAT denotes a dichotomous variable to capture differences attributed 
to changing the source of data from 1990 on, while DX refers to a dichotomous variable that seeks to 
remove outliers present in year X. The model specification tests are available upon request. # An outlier 
present in 1993 was removed previously to the modelling of the dependent variable. & Outliers present 
in 1989 and 1990 in the series of public revenues, it,  were removed previously to the modelling of the 
dependent variable.
Source: authors elaboration based on data from IMF (various) and ECLAC (2015).
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Table 4. 
Econometric estimation of PBuC in Colombia controlling by the GDP growth rate,  
1982-2014
Expenditure Total Current expenditure
Expenditure 

























































































R2 0.412 0.456 0.318 0.612 0.242 0.260
Figures in parenthesis are p-values. DAT denotes a dichotomous variable to capture differences attributed 
to changing the source of data from 1990 on, while DX refers to a dichotomous variable that seeks to 
remove outliers present in year X. The model specification tests are available upon request. 
Source: authors' elaboration based on data from IMF (various) and ECLAC (2015).
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Table 5. 
Econometric estimation of PBuC in Colombia controlling by the GDP gap, 1982-2014
Expenditure Total Current expenditure
Expenditure 


































































































R2 0.689 0.611 0.290 0.625 0.160 0.252
Figures in parenthesis are p-values. DAT denotes a dichotomous variable to capture differences 
attributed to changing the source of data from 1990 on, while DX refers to a dichotomous variable 
that seeks to remove outliers present in year X. The model specification tests are available upon 
request.
Source: authors' elaboration based on data from IMF (various) and ECLAC (2015).
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Table 6. 
Econometric estimation of PBuC in Colombia controlling by total government revenues, 
1982-2014
Expenditure Total Current expenditure
Expenditure 
































































































R2 0.404 0.094 0.499 0.152 0.329 0.352
Figures in parenthesis are p-values. DAT denotes a dichotomous variable to capture differences 
attributed to changing the source of data from 1990 on, while DX refers to a dichotomous variable 
that seeks to remove outliers present in year X. The model specification tests are available upon 
request.
Source: authors' elaboration based on data from IMF (various) and ECLAC (2015).
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Table 7. 
Econometric estimation of PBuC in Chile controlling by the GDP growth rate, 1982-2014
Expenditure Total* Current expenditure
Expenditure 






















































































R2 0.301 0.519 0.354 0.342 0.362 0.460
Figures in parenthesis are p-values. DAT denotes a dichotomous variable to capture differences 
attributed to changing the source of data from 1990 on, while DX refers to a dichotomous 
variable that seeks to remove outliers present in year X. The model specification tests are 
available upon request. * Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (White correction).
Source: authors' elaboration based on data from IMF (various) and ECLAC (2015).
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Table 8. 
Econometric estimation of PBuC in Chile controlling by the GDP gap, 1982-2014
Expenditure Total* Current expenditure
Expenditure 


















































































D1989 -20.127   (0.000)
-24.802
(0.000)
R2 0.629 0.672 0.330 0.196 0.184 0.473
Figures in parenthesis are p-values. DAT denotes a dichotomous variable to capture differences 
attributed to changing the source of data from 1990 on, while DX refers to a dichotomous 
variable that seeks to remove outliers present in year X. The model specification tests are 
available upon request. 
Source: authors' elaboration based on data from IMF (various) and ECLAC (2015).
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Table 9. 
Econometric estimation of PBuC in Chile controlling by total government revenues,  
1982-2014
Expenditure Total Current expenditure
Expenditure 
























































































R2 0.320 0.523 0.368 0.278 0.222 0.457
Figures in parenthesis are p-values. DAT denotes a dichotomous variable to capture differences 
attributed to changing the source of data from 1990 on, while DX refers to a dichotomous 
variable that seeks to remove outliers present in year X. The model specification tests are 
available upon request. 
Source: authors' elaboration based on data from IMF (various) and ECLAC (2015).
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